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ABSTRACT 
The Navy A-6E aircraft is presently being modified with a new wing which uses 
graphitelepoxy structures and substructures around a titanium load-bearing structure. The 
ability of the composites to conduct electricity is less than that of aluminum. This is cause for 
concern where the wing may be required to conduct large lightning currents. The manufacturer 
attempted to solve lightning protection issues by performing a risk assessment based on a 
statistical approach which allows relaxation of the wing lightning protection design levels over 
certain locations of the composite wing. This paper presents a sensitivity study designed to 
define the total risk of relaxation of the design levels. 
The new A-6 wing design uses graphite/epoxy structures in an effort to minimize weight 
while maximizing the strength and life of the wing (design life of 4400 hours). The flight 
control surfaces (i.e., slats and flaps) and aircraft fuselage are of metallic construction. The 
graphite/epoxy structures are connected to the inner wing by metal rivets. They are present in 
the wet wing area (fuel is contained behind these panels) as well as other areas which do not 
contain fuel. The composite panels do not conduct electricity as well as the aluminum they 
replace. 'This is cause for concern where the wing is required to conduct large lightning 
currents as a result of direct stroke attachment. Lightning channel attachment to the aircraft 
structure and/or wiring can result in damage to the aircraft surface and wiring. Traditional 
protection from direct attachment lightning effects consists of establishing a low impedance path 
between any two points where the lightning induced currents will flow. The Navy normally 
requires that aircraft meet the requirements of MIL-E-605 ID and MIL-B-5087B when tested 
to the waveforms and specifications of MIL-STD- 1757A. MIL-E-605 1D outlines the overall 
requirements for systems electromagnetic compatibility (EMC). MIL-E-605 1 D stipulates that 
lightning protection be guided in accordance with direction given in MIL-B-5087B. MIL-B- 
5087B specifies that protection for lightning requires that bonding allow discharge current to 
be carried between the extremities of an aircraft without risk of damage to flight controls or 
producing sparking or voltages within the vehicle in excess of 500 volts. These requirements 
are based on a lightning current waveform of 200 kA peak, a pulse width of 5 to 
10 microseconds and a rate of rise of 100 kA per microsecond. MIL-B-5087 also gives the 
following guidance for aircraft vehicle skin: "Vehicle skin shall be so designed that a uniform 
low-impedance skin is produced through inherent R F  bonding during construction. RF bonding 
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must be accomplished between all structural components comprising the vehicle". MIL-STD- 
1757A presents the standardized set of test waveforms and techniques to be used to qualify 
aerospace vehicles and hardware for lightning. The tests are designed to define the physical 
effects of lightning induced current and its interaction with fuel, structural and electrical 
hardware as well as indirect effects associated with strikes coupling to internal wiring and 
electronics. Lightning strike zones are defined dependent on attachment or transfer 
characteristics. Three major surface zones are identified. Zone 1 defines surfaces where there 
is a high probability of initial attachment. It is further broken down to Zone 1A and Zone 1B. 
Zone 1A is an initial attachment point with a low probability of flash hang-on (such as a leading 
edge). Zone 1B is an initial attachment point with a high probability of flash hang-on (such as 
a trailing edge). This zone should be designed to withstand direct strike lightning components 
up to 200 kA. Zone 2 defines surfaces for which there is a high probability of a lightning flash 
being swept by the airflow from a Zone 1 point of initial attachment. Zone 2 regions also sub- 
divide into 2A and 2B, dependent on the probability of flash hang-on. Zone 3 surfaces are 
required to conduct the induced current between any two Zone 1 regions but are not subject to 
direct attachment effects. Figure 1 depicts the MIL-STD- 1757A direct strike waveform 
components A, B, C, and D for 
required levels of protection, 
dependent on zoning. Another 
military standard (MIL-STD- 
I795A) also gives lightning 
design guidance for aerospace 
vehicles. It more clearly defines 
the concept of tailoring the 
lightning protection design 
requirements. It states that 
identification of zoning can be 
accomplished by use of analysis, 
attachment tests, similarity or 
any combination of these 
methods. It states that the direct 
effects waveform components A, 
B, C and D of MIL-STD-1757A 
should be used for design and 
verification purposes. 
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impedance requirement stated in Figure 1. MIL-STD- 1757A Current Components. 
MIL-B-5087B can normally be 
met by an all aluminum aircraft, 
but is much more difficult for one which is constructed with multiple materials which consist 
of many different electrical properties. The direct attachment requirements levied by MIL- 
STD-1757A and MIL-STD-I795A can normally be met by an all aluminum aircraft. Lightning 
testing has shown that composite structures and substructures behave differently than aluminum 
and indeed can be damaged by the large induced lightning currents specified in MIL-STD- 
1757A and MIL-STD-1795A. Herein lies the dichotomy of terms: The A-6 composite wings 
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consist of high-impedance composite panels attached to a medium-impedance titanium spar with 
low-impedance metallic fasteners and in electrical contact with low-impedance aluminum flight 
control surfaces. A uniform low-impedance skin is not possible in this configuration. The 
m~~iifaciiirei of :he A-6 composite wing zttempted to so!ve this dichotomy by applying a MIL- 
STD-1795A approach by performing a risk assessment based on analytical and statistical data. 
The methodology entailed definition of a probabilistic approach towards lightning design criteria 
as related to maximum lightning current amplitude and expected location of strike on the 
aircraft. The analysis considered wing surface zoning, scale model lightning strike lab studies, 
a computer simulation of lightning strike locations, lightning strike rates on tactical aircraft and 
lightning threat statistics. 
component A for definition of 
the Zone 1 threat. The moderate 
THE ANALYSIS 
10001 
threat (lower curve) was equated 
component D for definition of 
the Zone 2 threat. The number 
of wings times twice the total 
guaranteed flight hours per wing 
defines the total flight exposure 
(taking into account a safety 
factor of two). The total flight 
exposure times the lightning 
s t r ikes  per  hour  ( t h e  
manufacturer used 1 in 64,OOO 
flight hours as defined by Corbin 
[2]) defines the total strikes 
expected during the life of the 
wing. If the probability of the 
lightning strike distribution on 
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the aircraft is known then the 
strike probability to individual iigure 2. Cianos and Pierce Lightning Probabilities. 
aircraft areas can be defined. 
The lightning zone definition was 
accomplished by test of a 1/25 copper coated scale model at LTRI, Miami, Florida. The wing 
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ZONE DESCRIPTION 
SLATS EXTENDED 
(10% of Flt) 
OUTBOARD FENCE 
UPPER WING 
OUTBOARD SLAT TIP ZONE 1 
WING AREA AFT OF SLAT TIP 
OUTBOARDFENCE ZONE 1 
18" EITHER SIDE ZONE 2A 
ZONE 3A 
LARGEST STORES 
STATIONS L, 1, 2, 4, 5 .  R 
FRONT TIPS STRUCK FROM 
SLIGHTLY ABOVE HORIZON 








STATIONS L. 1, 2, 4, 5, R 
ALL POINTS ON WING STORES 
INCLUDING TIPS, EXCLUDING (STORE/WING 
FROM SLIGHTLY ABOVE HORIZON INTERFACE) 
ZONE 3 
ALL CONFICURATlONS WING TIPS ZONE 1 I 
The probability model then used this test data in the following lightning strike probability 
model: 
Where: 
C = Risk Measure (the expected number of lightning strikes with 
amplitudes greater than the design value) 
Lo = Lightning strikes per fleet flight hour 
t = Hours exposed to lightning (number of A-6 wings times twice the 
guaranteed flight hours) 
k = Number of wing areas (5) 
Pi = Probability of strike to critical wing area 
Q(ai) = Probability that strike exceeds design. 
A risk factor was assigned to each wing area ( 1  - 5) such that the total number of strikes 
which would be allowed to the total wing in excess of the design level over twice the wing 
lifetime was 0.5. This risk factor was distributed evenly over the five wing areas. This 
allowed calculation of q(ai) at each of the wing areas. Using this value as the known variable 
one could then enter the Cianos and Pierce chart to identify the respective unknown design 
value for the lightning current. Table I1 presents the calculated lightning attachment design 
levels identified as a function of wing areas. The lightning design requirement included the 
protection for Zone 1 and Zone 3 regions to the full 200 kA requirement. Wing area 3 
(Zone 2A) was specified at 40 kA, well in excess of the identified design level of 15 kA. 
q(ai) ai Pi 
WI?i'G AREA - 
(LAB DATA) x 100% ZONE CURRENT 
1 25 kA 
2A 13 kA 
1 34 kA 
2A 17 kA 
3 30  kA 
2A IS kA 
1 0.1 X 61132 = 0.00455 4.0% 
2 2/330 = 0.00606 38 % 
3 11195 = c ,00505 36 96 
4 9/198 = 0 4 5 5  4.0% 3 110 kA 
5 1061330 = 0.321 0.57% I 220 kA 
~~~ ~ 








This approach was accepted by the Navy. The strike rate was modified, however, to 
a rate of 1 in 3362. The strike rate chosen by the manufacturer was one of the least stressiiig 
strike rates reported by Corbin. The strike rates discussed in the Corbin data ranged from 
1 in 2,000,000 to 1 in 2,500. All of these values were related to p c e  time civilian flight and 
were not considered as adequate for an all weather attack aircraft. 
One concern associated with this statistical tailoring approach was the use of total 
exposure time as a variable. (i.e., if the number of wings procured decreased then this 
decreases the total exposure of the wing in the lightning environment which in turn can decrease 
the specification level). In an attempt to minimize the impact of number of wing sets on the 
statistical analyses the strike data was normalized to include only single wing events. This 
allowed calculation of a risk factor for each wing area using the 200 kA and 40 kA levels 
identified by analysis and the 200 kA and 100 kA levels specified by MIL-STD-1757A. These 
comparisons took into account restrikes as a result of swept strokes. Information presented by 
Fisher, etal. [3] indicates a restrike rate which can vary between 20 msec and 200 msec. The 
incorporation of restrikes in swept stroke regions (Zone 2) alters the Pi value in the wing 
areas 1 and 3. A comparison of the increased of strikes expected above the design criteria as 
a function of design level is shown in Figure 3. 
Several mitigating factors were taken into account during the specification tailoring 
effort. These factors included: (1) The use of only cloud-to-ground lightning and peace time 
strike data for definition of the lightning threat variable; (2) The Navy's use of JP-5 fuel; 
(3) The data from previous composite direct attachment testing which indicated that lightning 
induced currents on composites usually resulted in low energy arcing from the composite 
material [4-71; and, (4) The A-6 automatic Halon fire extinguisher. The mitigation factors are 
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Definition. A tactical aircraft 
will experience an airborne 
lightning environment which 
includes both cloud-to-ground 
and cloud-to-cloud lightning 
events. The Atmospheric 
Electricity Hazards Protection 
Program (AEHP) discussed 
by I3eavin [9] was an attempt 
to measure the lightning 
threat to tactical aircraft. In 
the early stages of the 
program there were few 
lightning strikes for each 
thunderstorm penetration. 
The majority of penetrations 
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EXPECTED STRIKES EXCEEDING DESIGN AS A 
FUNCTION OF DESIGN LEVEL 
Figure 3. Tailored Design Levels VS MIL-STD- 1757A. 
were attempted at or below the freezing level (levels < 16,000 feet) as a result of previous 
observed lightning interactions with aircraft as reported by Corbin [2]. The rate of strikes at 
this altitude resulted in few direct lightning strikes. Using new procedures the NASA 
test aircraft encountered frequent strikes on penetrations in the vicinity of 20,000 feet. This 
would lead the reader to conclude that the cloud-to-cloud aircraftllightning interaction is more 
probable. There are other factors, however, which reduce these cloud-to-cloud 
aircraftllightning interaction probabilities. Aircraft flying above 20,000 feet have more latitude 
in their flight path and can more easily "see and avoid" the thunderstorm cells. Aircraft in a 
take-off, departure, penetration, approach or landing pattern ( < 15,000 feet) are inore 
confined in their flight path due to flight path restrictions imposed by FAA for aircraft 
separation and obstacle clearance requirements. As a result the "see and avoid" capability is 
often not possible, therefore exposing the aircraft to increased cloud-to-ground aircraftllightning 
interactions. Additionally, most tactical aircraft have established procedures for thunderstorm 
penetration as directed in the aircraft type Naval Air Training and Operating Procedures 
Standardization (NATOPS) manuals. The direction given in these manuals is: "Unless the 
urgency of the mission precludes a deviation from course, intentional flight through 
thunderstorms should be avoided to preclude the high probability of damage to the airframe and 
components by impact of ice, hail and lightning ... If circumnavigation of the storm is 
impossible, penetrate the thunderstorm in the lower third of the storm cell.. . 'I The possibility 
of physical damage to the aircraft at the higher altitudes due to hail and ice result in procedures 
which enhance the cloud-to-ground aircraftllightning interaction probabilities. The amount of 
mitigating effect to the actual aircraft by definition of threat using cloud-to-ground interactions 
is therefore reduced. 
JP-5 Flammability. Flammable vapors can be ignited if the correct concentration of fuel-to-air 
mixture and temperature are present when introduced to a sufficient ignition source. A 
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vapor/air mixture is too rich too bum if there is insufficient vapor space in the fuel tank, as is 
the case in a fully fueled wing. A vapor/air mixture is too lean to burn if the vapor space is 
too large. Ignition of JP-5 requires that very high temperatures (> 104 degrees Fahrenheit) 
be associated with altitudes below 10,OOO feet. .4ny mixture of JP-5 and JP-4 significantly 
reduces this level of protection. The case of a fuel mixture occurs for Navy aircraft if joint 
Navy/Air Force operations are conducted and Navy aircraft are refueled in-flight by Air Force 
tankers (the Air Force uses JP-4 fuel). This mitigation effect is therefore reduced during joint 
operations. 
ComDosite Mate rial Lo w Energy Arcing, The source of ignition must be present at the Same 
time the vapor/air mixture can sustain combustion. This source must produce sufficient energy 
to produce a minimum combustion flame to sustain ignition. Ignition can occur as a result of 
sparking or hot spot interaction with the fuelhapor mixture. Numerous laboratory tests and 
analyses have been conducted to ascertain effects of lightning currents to composite material 
which enclose fuel tanks [4-7 and 16-19]. Tests comparing the hot spot time/teinperature 
characteristics of carbon epoxy ( U E )  and aluminum panels indicate that for swept stroke 
lightning the aluminum panels get hotter, but their peak temperatures and thermal dissipation 
occur two orders of magnitude faster than the C/E panels. The conclusions were that there is 
a considerable margin precluding hot spot ignition of fuel behind composite materials. 
Fav Sea lant At Wine Joints And Fasteners. The most significant lightning fuel ignition hazard 
was found to be interior sparking at the interface of adjacent materials or at fasteners. This can 
occur for both aluminurn and composite materials. It is normally caused by poor conductivity 
between the interface materials as a result of gaps or voids between the main conduction 
channel (the fastener) and the adjacent material (the aluminum or composite panel). The spark 
shower which can occur for untreated adjacent materials or fasteners can be of sufficient 
magnitude to cause f u d  ignition given the correct vapor/air mixture. The probability of arcing 
is higher for composite panels because of the poor conductivity as a result of interface surface 
irregularities. Additionally, in composite panels with fasteners, swept stroke testing has 
indicated that lightning has a tendency to attach to the fasteners regardless of panel material, [7] 
The composite wing incorporates a fay sealant internal lo the fuel tank at these interface joints 
in order to mitigate these effects. This sealant provides the primary protection for high energy 
spark mitigation as a result of direct effects lightning induced currents in wing Zone 2 regions. 
The sealant is designed to prevent arcing by suppressing the heated matter away from the fuel. 
Halon Fire Extinmishine Svstem. The A-6E composite wing has an additional survivability 
feature designed into the aircraft to preclude fuel fed fire. The wing incorporates a Halon fire 
extinguisher system which may be activakd in the anticipation of combat operations. When 
activated the vapodfuel void is monitored for sufficient energy which would ignite the 
vapodfuel mixture. Upon sensing auto-ignition of the fuel the system will discharge the halon 
into the void to extinguish the fire. This system can only be activated once in-flight and 
requires resevrecharge upon landing in the event i t  is activated but not used. 
RESULTS 
In order to more completely evaluate the effect of the multiple variables which were 
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utilized for the statistical analysis a sensitivity study was accomplished where each variable 
utilized in the analysis was given an upper and lower bound. The lightning amplitude threat 
definition was varied, the restrike rate was varied and the strike rate was varied. The change 
to the design level as a result of altering each of these variables is addressed below. 
The Threat Variable, Numerous studies have been accomplished to date regarding the lightning 
threat [8-141. Melander and Axup reported [lo and 131 that measurements of lightning currents 
on towers could be suspect data. Berger and Garbagnati measurements were taken on towers 
in mountains of Switzerland and Italy. Uncertainties can arise with data due to the presence 
of tower on rocky mountain. Larger amplitude strokes are thought to strike tall towers. Also 
it is thought that positive strikes are more prevalent at higher altitudes where the towers were 
located. Recently Podgorski [15] completed a study of lightning strikes on a tall tower and 
reported that the peak current distributions of lightning in cloud-to-ground strikes indicate that 
the lightning measurements of Berger were accurate. These and the tall tower measurements 
were compared to the Lightning Positioning and Tracking System (LPATS) network measured 
data from Atmospheric Research System Inc. to define the low probability occurrence 
distribution of data. The probability distribution of peak lightning currents was also evaluated 
for the data from the Lightning Direction Finders (LDFs). A unified lightning threat was 
derived for aircraft near/on ground (within 10oO meters) and in-flight. The results of variation 
of the lightning threat show that slight divergences (an increase from 0.008 to 0.015 strikes per 
wing above design level) exist at the higher design levels (> 70 kA) to major divergences (an 
increase from 0.008 to 0.05 strikes per wing above design level) exist below design levels of 
20 kA. 
The Restrike (Swept Stroke) Variable. The aircraft speed and physical wing dimensions were 
driving factors. Three values (0, 4, and 10 restrikes) were chosen based on the calculated 
boundaries using information on restrike rates identified by Fisher [7]. The impact of variation 
of restrikes while holding all other variables constant is shown in Figure 4. 
The Strike Rate. The strike rate data (1 in 3362) was Navy aircraft historical lightning strike 
rate data and considered only peacetime operations. A number of Navy pilots interviewed 
stated that it was their opinion that a number closer to 1 in 500 would be a more realistic strike 
rate. Although the historical Navy tactical aircraft strike data indicated a rate closer to 
I in 3362 the number of events may be understated. This Seems to be borne out by the 
interviews. Since the strike rate was tied to more of "see and avoid" peace time operations the 
1 in 500 number was established as the upper bound (Le., wartime operations), the 1 in 3362 
as the median (Le., normal ship based operations), and 1 in 10,OOO as the lower bound (i.e., 
shore based operations). Figure 5 shows the result of variation of the strike rate. The rate of 
1 in 500 shows a significant deviation in the vicinity of 60 kA and diverges exponentially below 
the 40 kA design level. 
The consequence of exceeding the lightning design protection can range from minor 
upset or damage of aircraft systems and subsystems to complete loss of aircraft due to fuel tank 
explosion. The worst case over-design strike could occur because the Zone 2 restrike region 
(wing area 3) can become Zone 1 due to migration of the Zone 1 initial attachment point onto 
the wing. The distance as related to the migration of the initial attachment position on the wing 
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along the flight path are 
shown in Table 111. 
0 
0 20 40 60 80 1 0 0  
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The dotted line in 
Table 111 indicates where the 
wing area 3,  Zone 2 
transition occurs. The region 
to the left of the line 
indicates the migration does 
not impact the composite 
panels on the top of the 
wing. The region to the right 
of the line indicates the initial 
attachment migration results 
in a Zone 1 threat of 200 kA 
can occur on the composite 
panels. The case of fuel 
ignition as a result of 
puncture or bum-through and 
direct interaction of the 
lightning current with the 
fuel is a possibility. 
Aluminum will exhibit burn- 
through in relation to the 
lightning dwell time. If the 
channel of 100 kA were to 
maintain the same relative 
position on the aircraft for a 
period of over 50 mSec then 
bum-through is possible. 
The equivalent sized 
composite panel without 
fasteners does not exhibit 
bum-through. The composite 
panel with fasteners, 
however, exhibited burn- 
through at dwell times below 
1 msec. The lightning threat 
EXPECTED STRIKES EXCEEDING DESIGN AS A 
FUNCTION OF DESIGN LEVEL 
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Zigure 4. Impact of Changing Restrike Rate. 
EXPECTED STRIKES EXCEEDING DESIGN AS A 
FUNCTlON of DESIGN LEVEL (ZONE 2) 
dwell time for- Zone 1A and 2A in accordance with MIL-STD-1757A is approximately 
500 microseconds. This could be cause for concern. 
CONCLUSIONS 
The direct effects lightning test levels of MIL-STD-1757A appear to be highly 
conservative for lightning design guidance if areas on the aircraft structure exhibit a low 
probability of direct attachment. The tailoring of lightning design levels can be accomplished 
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on a given platform if the dynamics of flight regime and threat remain relatively constant, 
however, this case history indicates that a relaxation of design levels below 60 kA for swept 
stroke regions can be hazardous. The manufacturer of the A-6 composite wing, using generally 
acceptable procedures outlined in MIL-STD- 1795A, was able to justify a relaxation of MIL- 
STD- 1757A swept stroke design levels from 100 kA to 40 kA for a portion of the wing surface. 
The disturbing finding of this study was that of the migration of the Zone 1 regions into the 
area of composite material which has shown inability to conduct these high currents without 
damage. Additionally, given the worst case scenarios by which all variables could be adversely 
affected simultaneously the mitigation factors become subordinate to the lightning protection 
deficiencies. 
The A-6E composite wing lightning protection design appears sufficient for adequate 
protection to a reasonable lightning threat. The requirement for design levels for wing area 3, 
Zone 2 to be above 40 kA has been analyzed and found to be desirable but not absolutely 
necessary due to low probabilities of direct lightning interaction in these regions. The A-6 
composite wing design features diminish, but do not eliminate the risk of catastrophic damage 
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